forum2.quizizz.com/la-autoridad-de-metal.php A prolific blogger and a compulsive Twitter user with more than 1.
It is a little too long and seems unfocused. Ash piles are made to yield millions. Type of people scared to ride in the HOV lane when alone! My sister had a less-expensive wedding photographer, and she was definitely less than happy with the results. He has been drinking straight from the bourbon bottle and succumbing to the stress and pressure, but they are ahead "eighteen thousand.
His impressive intellectual stature in the Valley can probably be attributed to the simple fact that he is much better read than your average tech entrepreneur. A Zelig-like presence on both sides of the Atlantic, he hobnobs with government officials in Washington and London, advising them on the Next Big Thing. None of this is necessarily bad. He has publicly endorsed Obama and supported many of his key reforms.
He has written favorably about the work of little-known local officials transforming American cities.
No one has done more to turn important debates about technology—debates that used to be about rights, ethics, and politics—into kumbaya celebrations of the entrepreneurial spirit while making it seem as if the language of economics was, in fact, the only reasonable way to talk about the subject. His true hero is the hacker-cum-entrepreneur, someone who overcomes the insurmountable obstacles erected by giant corporations and lazy bureaucrats in order to fulfill the American Dream 2.
Hiding beneath this glossy veneer of disruption-talk is the same old gospel of individualism, small government, and market fundamentalism that we associate with Randian characters. For Silicon Valley and its idols, innovation is the new selfishness. Six years later, it began retaining rights to some of the manuals it was producing for individual clients and gradually branched out into more mainstream publishing. This is where he tested all his trademark discursive interventions: hosting a summit to define the concept, penning provocative essays to refine it, producing a host of books and events to popularize it, and cultivating a network of thinkers to proselytize it.
Open source software was born out of an ideological cleavage between two groups that, at least before , had been traditionally lumped together. In one corner stood a group of passionate and principled geeks, led by Richard Stallman of the Free Software Foundation, preoccupied with ensuring that users had rights with respect to their computer programs.
Perhaps inadvertently, Stallman also made a prescient argument for treating code, and technological infrastructure more broadly, as something that ought to be subject to public scrutiny. He sought to open up the very technological black boxes that corporations conspired to keep shut. Had his efforts succeeded, we might already be living in a world where the intricacies of software used for high-frequency trading or biometric identification presented no major mysteries.
Some, like Linus Torvalds, the Finnish creator of the much-celebrated Linux operating system, did so for fun; some because they wanted to build more convenient software; some because they wanted to learn new and much-demanded skills. Once the corporate world began expressing interest in free software, many nonpolitical geeks sensed a lucrative business opportunity.
I saw something different. I saw a business plan in disguise. After all, he was trying to launch a radical social movement, not a complacent business association. The timing was right. Netscape had just marked its capitulation to Microsoft in the so-called Browser Wars and promised both that all future versions of Netscape Communicator would be released free of charge and that its code would also be made publicly available.
Stallman was not invited. Emphasizing its highly distributed nature, Raymond captured the essence of open source software in a big-paradigm kind of way that could spellbind McKinsey consultants and leftist academics alike. On the one hand, he published manuals that helped to train new converts to the cause. On the other hand, those manuals were pricey. They were also of excellent quality, which, as Stallman once complained, discouraged the community from producing inexpensive alternatives. Stallman the social reformer could wait for decades until his ethical argument for free software prevailed in the public debate.
In those early days, the messaging around open source occasionally bordered on propaganda. Instead, it put all the emphasis on how it was pursuing those ends—in an extremely decentralized manner, using Internet platforms, with little central coordination. In contrast to free software, then, open source had no obvious moral component. I advocate open source, because. While free software was meant to force developers to lose sleep over ethical dilemmas, open source software was meant to end their insomnia.
The coup succeeded. In just a few years, that narrative became the standard way to talk about Internet history, giving it the kind of neat intellectual coherence that it never actually had. Since no code changed hands when we used Google or Amazon, it was counterproductive to fixate on licenses. So what did matter about open source? This was the freedom of the producer, the Randian entrepreneur, who must be left to innovate, undisturbed by laws and ethics. For all his economistic outlook, he was not one to talk externalities. Governments are constantly pushed to do things someone in the private sector may not like; why should the software industry be special?
Occasionally this stance led to paradoxes, as, for example, during a heated debate on whether governments should be required to ditch Microsoft and switch to open source software. There was a fair amount of semantic manipulation at play here. For Stallman, licenses were never an end in themselves; they mattered only as much as they codified a set of practices deriving from his vision of a technologically mediated good life. Licenses, in other words, were just the means to enable the one and only end that mattered to free software advocates: freedom.
A different set of technological practices—e. Sure, there were exceptions—like the highly political and legalistic community that worked on Debian, yet another operating system—but they were the exceptions that proved the rule. Open encourages competition. Unsurprisingly, the availability of source code for universal examination soon became the one and only benchmark of openness. What the code did was of little importance—the market knows best! The new paradigm was presented as something that went beyond ideology and could attract corporate executives without losing its appeal to the hacker crowd.
It took a lot of creative work to make the new paradigm stick. One common tactic was to present open source as having a much longer history that even predates History was something that clever PR could easily fix. And the second agenda was really to make a statement of some kind [that] this was a movement, that all these different programs had something in common. Telling a coherent story about open source required finding some inner logic to the history of the Internet.
No moralizing let alone legislation was needed; the Internet already lived and breathed open source. Now that apps might be displacing the browser, the openness once taken for granted is no more—a contingency that licenses and morals could have easily prevented. Openness as a happenstance of market conditions is a very different beast from openness as a guaranteed product of laws. One of the key consequences of linking the Internet to the world of open source was to establish the primacy of the Internet as the new, reinvented desktop—as the greatest, and perhaps ultimate, platform—for hosting third-party services and applications.
Stallman had on offer something far more precise and revolutionary: a way to think about the freedoms of individual users in specific contexts, as if the well-being of the mega-platform were of secondary importance. But that vision never came to pass. Their functionality was pretty basic—they allowed customers to make purchases or look up something on a map—so their value proposition lay in the information they delivered, not in the software function they executed. And all those fancy Internet services that made infoware possible were patched together with open source software.
Now it was all about Amazon learning from its customers and Google learning from the sites in its index. He fired a quarter of his staff, and things looked pretty dire. What set Web 2. All Silicon Valley companies should heed the lesson of those few who survived: they must find a way to harness collective intelligence and make it part of their business model. They must become true carriers of the Web 2. There was some theoretical ambition to this label—more about that later on—but the primary goal was to show that the market crash did not mean the end of the web and that it was time to put the crash behind us and start learning from those who survived.
Given how much rhetorical capital had been spent on linking the idea of the web with that of open source, the end of the web would also mean the end of so many other concepts. Most memorable dotcom failures—cases like Pets. It seems that anyone who wanted to claim that a revolution was under way in their own field did so simply by invoking the idea of Web 2.
What unites most of these papers is a shared background assumption that, thanks to the coming of Web 2. Except that there was no coming of Web 2. Why anyone dealing with stress management or Wittgenstein would be moved by the logistics of conference organizing is a mystery. In a Web 2. A revolution was in the making! This was a typical consequence of relying on Web 2. And soon Web 2. Most technology analysts simply borrowed the label to explain whatever needed explaining, taking its utility and objectivity for granted. Everything needed to be rethought and redone: enterprises, governments, health care, finance, factory production.
It strikes us that the Web might teach us new ways to address these limits. All those contexts belonged to the Internet now. Internet-centrism won. I n his book Crazy Talk, Stupid Talk , Neil Postman pointed to a certain linguistic imperialism that propels crazy talk. For example, to say that Tehran is the capital of Iraq is stupid talk.
For Postman, one of the main tasks of language is to codify and preserve distinctions among different semantic environments. If each of them serves the same function, then none of them serves any function. When such a process is occurring, an appropriate word for it is pollution. Korzybski founded a movement called general semantics. Ron Hubbard claimed to have been a fan—it also earned the support of many serious thinkers, from cyberneticians like Anatol Rapoport to philosophers like Gaston Bachelard.
There was nothing harmful in this per se—Korzybski simply wanted to make people aware of the highly selective nature of abstracting and give us the tools to detect it in our everyday conversations. There is a philosophy to them: a philosophy of knowledge and language inspired by Korzybski. As Web 2. It is this philosophy, and the architecture based on it, that has allowed open source projects to be assembled into larger systems such as Linux, without explicit coordination between developers.
In his bestseller Words That Work , the Republican operative Frank Luntz lists ten rules of effective communication: simplicity, brevity, credibility, consistency, novelty, sound, aspiration, visualization, questioning, and context. Clever use of visualization, for example, helps him craft his message in a way that is both sharp and open-ended.
The exact nature of these connections is rarely explained in full, but this is all for the better, as the reader might eventually interpret connections with their own agendas in mind. This is why the name of the meme must be as inclusive as possible: you never know who your eventual allies might be.
Web 2. Strata is about defining the new field of data science. Velocity is about making clear that the applications of the web depend on people to keep them running, unlike past generations of software that were simply software artifacts. Such dexterity not only helps in organizing new events and investing in cool start-ups; it also, as those six thousand papers that cite Web 2.
Brown bourbon - while playing and losing a mediocre game of pool with his buddy. When he makes an almost-impossible shot "you couldn't make that shot again in a million years" , he repeats the spectacular shot with higher stakes, and misses. After the credits play, the scene is set in the stylized interior of the second-story Ames Billiard Hall as it is being opened for business in New York City [the renowned Ames Billiard Academy on 44th St.
Known for where the country's top pool player rules the underground, it appears as a seedy, tarnished, shadowy, urban downtown pool hall. When Eddie with his own pool cue case under his arm and Burns enter reverentially, they speak of the holy, religious atmosphere of the place, where high-stakes pool games are decided and destinies are often made or destroyed upon the green-felted tables:. Burns: It's quiet. Eddie: Yeah, like a church. Church of the Good Hustler. Burns: It looks more like a morgue to me.
Those tables are the slabs they lay the stiffs on. Eddie: I'll be alive when I get out, Charlie. This is Ames, Mister. Ten grand, I'm gonna win ten grand in one night. Well, who's gonna beat me? I mean, what other pool room is there in the country where a guy can walk out with ten grand in one night? Fats don't need your money. There's no way you can beat him. Nobody's beat him in fifteen years. He's the best in the country. Just stay where you are. He'll find you. At eight o'clock sharp, the dapper, rotund, reigning championship player makes his dramatic entrance, cued by his cronies that there's a competitor waiting to play.
After watching Eddie play for a few moments, he compliments the talented player from Oakland, California: "You shoot a good stick. They say that old Fats just shoots the eyes right off them balls. Do you think this boy is a hustler? Fats: Do you like to gamble, Eddie? Gamble money on pool games? Eddie: Fats, let's you and I shoot a game of straight pool. Fats: A hundred dollars.
Cash Fast (In 30 Days or Less): The Way of. How To Make Cash Fast (In 30 Days or Less): The Way of the Hustler Kindle Edition. by Robert Allen (Author). How To Make Cash Fast In 30 Days or Less The Way of the Hustler (Japanese Edition) - Kindle edition by Robato. Download it once and read it on your Kindle.
Eddie: Well, you shoot big-time pool, Fats. I mean, that's what everybody says, 'You shoot big-time pool. Fats: Now I know why they call you 'Fast' Eddie. Eddie, you talk my kind of talk. Before the high-stakes exciting pool game before a large audience, in the seamy, smoky, sleazy, and boozy atmosphere of the pool hall, Fats ritualistically washes his hands in a side-room and sprinkles talcum powder on them.
In his gut, Eddie feels "tight but good. The tension begins to mount between the two players even after the first shot:. Eddie can't help but admire the skill with which Fats dispatches shot after shot:. He is great! Geez, that old Fat Man. Look at the way he moves, like a dancer And those fingers, them chubby fingers. And that stroke, it's like he's uh, like he's playin' a violin or somethin'.
At midnight, the game proceeds between the two virtuoso players, shown in a montage of sideviews of intent onlookers, called-shots, the clicking sounds of the shiny balls, scorekeeping by Alexander Rose , and wagered wads of bills - deceptively calm, Fats appears to be winning. Charlie cautions Eddie at am: "Quit, he's too good. Eddie: Well, you don't leave much when you miss, do ya Fat Man? Fats: That's what the game's all about.
As he shoots and the night progresses, the tide turns in Eddie's favor and he boasts: "You know, I gotta hunch, Fat Man. I've gotta hunch it's me from here-on in I mean, did that ever happen to you? When all of a sudden, you feel like you can't miss? And I dreamed about this game every night on the road You know, this is my table, man, I own it In a parallel move, they both strip off their outer coats for the real match. On his return to the game, the Preacher notifies the shrewd, expensively-dressed, big-time gambler Bert Gordon George C.
Scott , whose drink of choice at a poker game is milk, of the hustler in town. Gordon, who is Fats' backer and bankrolls his games, watches soundlessly from the sidelines and pays up when Fats loses. After the clock spins from am [an obvious discontinuity problem] to am, the pool attendant opens the venetian blinds and floods the room with bright sunlight - Fats winces and orders: "Will you cut that sunshine out? Eddie: The pool game is over when Fats says it's over I came after him and I'm gonna get him. I'm goin' with him all the way.
The pool game is not over until Minnesota Fats says it's over. Is it over, Fats? Fats turns to Gordon for the answer. To Gordon I'm gonna beat him, Mister. I beat him all night and I'm gonna beat him all day. I'm, I'm the best you ever seen, Fats. I'm the best there is. Now even if you beat me, I'm still the best. Gordon: To Fats Stay with this kid. He's a loser. Eddie: To Charlie What did he say?
After 25 hours of straight play in the epic match - it's nine pm the next day - Eddie is slowly losing his edge by becoming intoxicated. He has been drinking straight from the bourbon bottle and succumbing to the stress and pressure, but they are ahead "eighteen thousand. After Fats freshens up by combing his hair, methodically washing his hands in the side bathroom, rubbing his hands with powder, donning his coat and straightening his clothes, he is readied to overwhelm his opponent. Fats appears as fresh as he did at the start of their struggle:.
Fats: Fast Eddie, let's play some pool. Eddie: unsteadily You look beautiful, Fats, just like a baby, all pink and powdered up.