Kant offers a second formulation to address the material side of the moral law. Kant argues that the moral law must be aimed at an end that is not merely instrumental, but is rather an end in itself. Only rational agents, according to Kant, are ends in themselves. To act morally is thus to respect rational agents as ends in themselves. The basic idea here is that it is immoral to treat someone as a thing of merely instrumental value; persons have an intrinsic non-instrumental value, and the moral law demands that we respect this intrinsic value.
To return to the example of the previous paragraphs, it would be wrong to lie about an adulterous liaison because by withholding the truth one is manipulating the other person to make things easier for oneself; this sort of manipulation, however, amounts to treating the other as a thing as a mere means to the comfort of not getting in trouble , and not as a person deserving of respect and entitled to the truth. The notion of a universal law provides the form of the categorical imperative and rational agents as ends in themselves provide the matter. Although humanity may never be able to achieve such a perfect state of utopian coexistence, we can at least strive to approximate this state to an ever greater degree.
In Critique of Pure Reason , Kant had argued that although we can acknowledge the bare logical possibility that humans possess free will, that there is an immortal soul, and that there is a God, he also argued that we can never have positive knowledge of these things see 2g above.
In his ethical writings, however, Kant complicates this story. He argues that despite the theoretical impossibility of knowledge of these objects, belief in them is nevertheless a precondition for moral action and for practical cognition generally. We will start with freedom. Kant argues that morality and the obligation that comes with it are only possible if humans have free will. Kant argues that if we presuppose that humans are rational and have free will, then his entire moral theory follows directly.
The problem, however, lies in justifying the belief that we are free. The only room for freedom of the will would lie in the realm of things in themselves, which contains the noumenal correlate of my phenomenal self. Since things in themselves are unknowable, I can never look to them to get evidence that I possess transcendental freedom.
Kant gives at least two arguments to justify belief in freedom as a precondition of his moral theory. There is a great deal of controversy among commentators regarding the exact form of his arguments, as well as their success. It will not be possible to adjudicate those disputes in any detail here. See Section 10 References and Further Readings for references to some of these commentaries.
In the Groundwork , Kant suggests that the presupposition that we are free follows as a consequence of the fact that we have practical reason and that we think of ourselves as practical agents.
Any time I face a choice that requires deliberation, I must consider the options before me as really open. If I thought of my course of action as already determined ahead of time, then there would not really be any choice to make. Furthermore, in taking my deliberation to be real, I also think of the possible outcomes of my actions as caused by me. The notion of a causality that originates in the self is the notion of a free will. So the very fact that I do deliberate about what actions I will take means that I am presupposing that my choice is real and hence that I am free.
The position seems to be that I must act as though I am free, but acting as though I am free in no way entails that I really am free. At best, it seems that since I act as though I am free, I thereby must act as though morality really does obligate me. This does not establish that the moral law really does obligate me. In the Second Critique , Kant offers a different argument for the reality of freedom. In other words, all rational agents are at least implicitly conscious of the bindingness of the moral law on us. Since morality requires freedom, it follows that if morality is real, then freedom must be real too.
Although the conclusion of this argument is stronger than the earlier argument, its premise is more controversial. For instance, it is far from obvious that all rational agents are conscious of the moral law. If they were, how come no one discovered this exact moral law before when Kant wrote the Groundwork?
It may just be that we cannot help but believe that the moral law obligates us, in which case we once again end up merely acting as though we are free and as though the moral law is real. For instance, there is no sense in which I am obligated to single-handedly solve global poverty, because it is not within my power to do so. According to Kant, the ultimate aim of a rational moral agent should be to become perfectly moral. We are obligated to strive to become ever more moral.
However, Kant holds that moral perfection is something that finite rational agents such as humans can only progress towards, but not actually attain in any finite amount of time, and certainly not within any one human lifetime. This endless progress towards perfection can only be demanded of us if our own existence is endless. According to Kant, the highest good, that is, the most perfect possible state for a community of rational agents, is not only one in which all agents act in complete conformity with the moral law.
It is also a state in which these agents are happy. Kant had argued that although everyone naturally desires to be happy, happiness is only good when one deserves to be happy. In the ideal scenario of a morally perfect community of rational agents, everyone deserves to be happy. Since a deserved happiness is a good thing, the highest good will involve a situation in which everyone acts in complete conformity with the moral law and everyone is completely happy because they deserve to be. This is where a puzzle arises. Although happiness is connected to morality at the conceptual level when one deserves happiness, there is no natural connection between morality and happiness.
Our happiness depends on the natural world for example, whether we are healthy, whether natural disasters affect us , and the natural world operates according to laws that are completely separate from the laws of morality. Accordingly, acting morally is in general no guarantee that nature will make it possible for one to be happy. And we all have plenty of empirical evidence from the world we live in that often bad things happen to good people and good things happen to bad people.
Thus if the highest good in which happiness is proportioned to virtue is possible, then somehow there must be a way for the laws of nature to eventually lead to a situation in which happiness is proportioned to virtue. Since the laws of nature and the laws of morality are completely separate on their own, the only way that the two could come together such that happiness ends up proportioned to virtue would be if the ultimate cause and ground of nature set up the world in such a way that the laws of nature would eventually lead to the perfect state in question.
Therefore, the possibility of the highest good requires the presupposition that the cause of the world is intelligent and powerful enough to set nature up in the right way, and also that it wills in accordance with justice that eventually the laws of nature will indeed lead to a state in which the happiness of rational agents is proportioned to their virtue.
The natural purpose of humanity is the development of reason. This development is not something that can take place in one individual lifetime, but is instead the ongoing project of humanity across the generations. Nature fosters this goal through both human physiology and human psychology.
Humans have no fur, claws, or sharp teeth, and so if we are to be sheltered and fed, we must use our reason to create the tools necessary to satisfy our needs. The frustration brought on by disagreement serves as an incentive to develop our capacity to reason so that we can argue persuasively and convince others to agree with us. By means of our physiological deficiencies and our unsocial sociability, nature has nudged us, generation by generation, to develop our capacity for reason and slowly to emerge from the hazy fog of pre-history up to the present.
This development is not yet complete. Kant takes stock of where we were in his day, in late 18 th c. This is a slow, on-going process. Kant thought that his own age was an age of enlightenment, but not yet a fully enlightened age. The goal of humanity is to reach a point where all interpersonal interactions are conducted in accordance with reason, and hence in accordance with the moral law this is the idea of a kingdom of ends described in 5b above.
Kant thinks that there are two significant conditions that must be in place before such an enlightened age can come to be. First, humans must live in a perfectly just society under a perfectly just constitution. Implicit in this definition is a theory of equality: everyone should be granted the same degree of freedom. Although a state, through the passing and enforcing of laws, necessarily restricts freedom to some degree, Kant argues that this is necessary for the preservation of equality of human freedom. Hence a fair and lawful coercion that restricts freedom is consistent with and required by maximal and equal degrees of freedom for all.
Kant holds that republicanism is the ideal form of government. In a republic, voters elect representatives and these representatives decide on particular laws on behalf of the people. Kant shows that he was not free of the prejudices of his day, and claims, with little argument, that neither women nor the poor should be full citizens with voting rights.
Even though the entire population does not vote on each individual law, a law is said to be just only in case an entire population of rational agents could and would consent to the law. Among the freedoms that ought to be respected in a just society republican or otherwise are the freedom to pursue happiness in any way one chooses so long as this pursuit does not infringe the rights of others, of course , freedom of religion, and freedom of speech.
Kant himself had felt the sting of an infringement on these rights when the government of Friedrich Wilhelm II the successor to Frederick the Great prohibited Kant from publishing anything further on matters pertaining to religion. The basic idea is that world peace can be achieved only when international relations mirror, in certain respects, the relations between individuals in a just society. Just as people cannot be traded as things, so too states cannot be traded as though they were mere property.
Of course, until a state of perpetual peace is reached, wars will be inevitable. Even in times of wars, however, certain laws must be respected. For instance, it is never permissible for hostilities to become so violent as to undermine the possibility of a future peace treaty. Kant argued that republicanism is especially conducive to peace, and he argued that perpetual peace would require that all states be republics.
This is because the people will only consent to a war if they are willing to bear the economic burdens that war brings, and such a cost will only be worthwhile when there is a truly dire threat. If only the will of the monarch is required to go to war, since the monarch will not have to bear the full burden of the war the cost will be distributed among the subjects , there is much less disincentive against war.
According to Kant, war is the result of an imbalance or disequilibrium in international relations. Although wars are never desirable, they lead to new conditions in international relations, and sometimes these new conditions are more balanced than the previous ones. When they are more balanced, there is less chance of new war occurring. Overall then, although the progression is messy and violent along the way, the slow march towards perpetual peace is a process in which all the states of the world slowly work towards a condition of balance and equilibrium.
That is, Kant explains what it is for something to be beautiful by explaining what goes into the judgment that something is beautiful. Kant holds that there are three different types of aesthetic judgments: judgments of the agreeable, of the beautiful, and of the sublime. The first is not particularly interesting, because it pertains simply to whatever objects happen to cause us personally pleasure or pain.
There is nothing universal about such judgments. If one person finds botanical gin pleasant and another does not, there is no disagreement, simply different responses to the stimulus. Judgments of the beautiful and the sublime, however, are more interesting and worth spending some time on. We have an appreciation for the object without desiring it. This contrasts judgments of taste from both cognitions, which represent objects as they are rather than how they affect us, and desires, which represent objects in terms of what we want.
Second, judgments of taste involve universality. When we judge an object to be beautiful, implicit in the judgment is the belief that everyone should judge the object in the same way. Fourth, judgments of taste involve necessity. When presented with a beautiful object, I take it that I ought to judge it as beautiful. Taken together, the theory is this: when I judge something as beautiful, I enjoy the object without having any desires with respect to it, I believe that everyone should judge the object to be beautiful, I represent some kind of purposiveness in it, but without applying any concepts that would determine its specific purpose, and I also represent myself as being obligated to judge it to be beautiful.
Judgments of beauty are thus quite peculiar. On the one hand, when we say an object is beautiful, it is not the same sort of predication as when I say something is green, is a horse, or fits in a breadbox. Yet it is not for that reason a purely subjective, personal judgment because of the necessity and intersubjective universality involved in such judgments.
When I encounter an unfamiliar object, my reflective judgment is set in motion and seeks a concept until I figure out what sort of thing the object is. When I encounter a beautiful object, the form of purposiveness in the object also sets my reflecting judgment in motion, but no determinate concept is ever found for the object.
The experience of this free play of the faculties is the part of the aesthetic experience that we take to be enjoyable. Aside from judgments of taste, there is another important form of aesthetic experience: the experience of the sublime. According to Kant, the experience of the sublime occurs when we face things whether natural or manmade that dwarf the imagination and make us feel tiny and insignificant in comparison. When we face something so large that we cannot come up with a concept to adequately capture its magnitude, we experience a feeling akin to vertigo.
We already have trouble comprehending the enormity of the Milky Way, but when we see an image containing thousands of other galaxies of approximately the same size, the mind cannot even hope to comprehend the immensity of what is depicted. Although this sort of experience can be disconcerting, Kant also says that a disinterested pleasure similar to the pleasure in the beautiful is experienced when the ideas of reason pertaining to the totality of the cosmos are brought into play. This feeling that reason can subsume and capture even the totality of the immeasurable cosmos leads to the peculiar pleasure of the sublime.
Both natural objects and manmade art can be judged to be beautiful. Kant suggests that natural beauties are purest, but works of art are especially interesting because they result from human genius. Although art must be manmade and not natural, Kant holds that art is beautiful insofar as it imitates the beauty of nature. What makes great art truly great, though, is that it is the result of genius in the artist. These can, of course, be combined together. For instance opera combines music and poetry into song, and combines this with theatre which Kant considers a form of painting.
Kant deems poetry the greatest of the arts because of its ability to stimulate the imagination and understanding and expand the mind through reflection. However, if the question is which art advances culture the most, Kant thinks that painting is better than music. At best, such works can be interesting or provocative, but not truly beautiful and hence not truly art. This is because certain aspects of judgments of taste see 7a above are analogous in important respects to moral judgments.
The immediacy and disinterestedness of aesthetic appreciation corresponds to the demand that moral virtue be praised even when it does not lead to tangibly beneficial consequences: it is good in itself. The free play of the faculties involved in appreciation of the beautiful reminds one of the freedom necessary for and presupposed by morality. And the universality and necessity involved in aesthetic judgments correspond to the universality and necessity of the moral law.
In short, Kant holds that a cultivated sensitivity to aesthetic pleasures helps prepare the mind for moral cognition. Aesthetic appreciation makes one sensitive to the fact that there are pleasures beyond the merely agreeable just as there are goods beyond the merely instrumental. Towards the end of his career, Kant allowed his collected lecture notes for his anthropology course to be edited and published as Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Anthropology, for Kant, is simply the study of human nature. Pragmatic anthropology is useful, practical knowledge that students would need in order to successfully navigate the world and get through life.
The Anthropology is interesting in two very different ways. First, Kant presents detailed discussions of his views on issues related to empirical psychology, moral psychology, and aesthetic taste that fill out and give substance to the highly abstract presentations of his writings in pure theoretical philosophy. For instance, although in the theory of experience from Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that we need sensory intuitions in order to have empirical cognition of the world, he does not explain in any detail how our specific senses—sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell—contribute to this cognition.
Rather, the premises of an inductive logical argument indicate some degree of support inductive probability for the conclusion but do not entail it; that is, they suggest truth but do not ensure it.
In this manner, there is the possibility of moving from general statements to individual instances for example, statistical syllogisms, discussed below. Note that the definition of inductive reasoning described here differs from mathematical induction , which, in fact, is a form of deductive reasoning. Mathematical induction is used to provide strict proofs of the properties of recursively defined sets. Both mathematical induction and proof by exhaustion are examples of complete induction.
Complete induction is a masked type of deductive reasoning. In , early modern philosopher Francis Bacon repudiated the value of mere experience and enumerative induction alone. His method of inductivism required that minute and many-varied observations that uncovered the natural world's structure and causal relations needed to be coupled with enumerative induction in order to have knowledge beyond the present scope of experience. Inductivism therefore required enumerative induction as a component.
The empiricist David Hume 's stance found enumerative induction to have no rational, let alone logical, basis but instead induction was a custom of the mind and an everyday requirement to live. While observations, such as the motion of the sun, could be coupled with the principle of the uniformity of nature to produce conclusions that seemed to be certain, the problem of induction arose from the fact that the uniformity of nature was not a logically valid principle.
Hume was sceptical of the application of enumerative induction and reason to reach certainty about unobservables and especially the inference of causality from the fact that modifying an aspect of a relationship prevents or produces a particular outcome. Awakened from "dogmatic slumber" by a German translation of Hume's work, Kant sought to explain the possibility of metaphysics. In , Kant's Critique of Pure Reason introduced rationalism as a path toward knowledge distinct from empiricism. Kant sorted statements into two types.
Analytic statements are true by virtue of the arrangement of their terms and meanings , thus analytic statements are tautologies , merely logical truths, true by necessity. Whereas synthetic statements hold meanings to refer to states of facts, contingencies.
Finding it impossible to know objects as they truly are in themselves, however, Kant concluded that the philosopher's task should not be to try to peer behind the veil of appearance to view the noumena , but simply that of handling phenomena. Reasoning that the mind must contain its own categories for organizing sense data , making experience of space and time possible, Kant concluded that the uniformity of nature was an a priori truth. Kant thus saved both metaphysics and Newton's law of universal gravitation , but as a consequence discarded scientific realism and developed transcendental idealism.
Kant's transcendental idealism gave birth to the movement of German idealism. Hegel 's absolute idealism subsequently flourished across continental Europe. Positivism , developed by Saint-Simon and promulgated in the s by his former student Comte , was the first late modern philosophy of science. In the aftermath of the French Revolution , fearing society's ruin, Comte opposed metaphysics.
Human knowledge had evolved from religion to metaphysics to science, said Comte, which had flowed from mathematics to astronomy to physics to chemistry to biology to sociology —in that order—describing increasingly intricate domains. All of society's knowledge had become scientific, with questions of theology and of metaphysics being unanswerable.
Comte found enumerative induction reliable as a consequence of its grounding in available experience. He asserted the use of science, rather than metaphysical truth, as the correct method for the improvement of human society. According to Comte, scientific method frames predictions, confirms them, and states laws—positive statements—irrefutable by theology or by metaphysics. Regarding experience as justifying enumerative induction by demonstrating the uniformity of nature ,  the British philosopher John Stuart Mill welcomed Comte's positivism, but thought scientific laws susceptible to recall or revision and Mill also withheld from Comte's Religion of Humanity.
Comte was confident in treating scientific law as an irrefutable foundation for all knowledge , and believed that churches, honouring eminent scientists, ought to focus public mindset on altruism —a term Comte coined—to apply science for humankind's social welfare via sociology , Comte's leading science. During the s and s, while Comte and Mill were the leading philosophers of science, William Whewell found enumerative induction not nearly as convincing, and, despite the dominance of inductivism, formulated "superinduction".
The creation of Conceptions is easily overlooked and prior to Whewell was rarely recognised.
Having once had the phenomena bound together in their minds in virtue of the Conception, men can no longer easily restore them back to detached and incoherent condition in which they were before they were thus combined. These "superinduced" explanations may well be flawed, but their accuracy is suggested when they exhibit what Whewell termed consilience —that is, simultaneously predicting the inductive generalizations in multiple areas—a feat that, according to Whewell, can establish their truth. Perhaps to accommodate the prevailing view of science as inductivist method, Whewell devoted several chapters to "methods of induction" and sometimes used the phrase "logic of induction", despite the fact that induction lacks rules and cannot be trained.
In the s, the originator of pragmatism , C S Peirce performed vast investigations that clarified the basis of deductive inference as a mathematical proof as, independently, did Gottlob Frege. Peirce recognized induction but always insisted on a third type of inference that Peirce variously termed abduction or retroduction or hypothesis or presumption.
Having highlighted Hume's problem of induction , John Maynard Keynes posed logical probability as its answer, or as near a solution as he could arrive at. The principle of induction, as applied to causation, says that, if A has been found very often accompanied or followed by B , then it is probable that on the next occasion on which A is observed, it will be accompanied or followed by B. If the principle is to be adequate, a sufficient number of instances must make the probability not far short of certainty. If this principle, or any other from which it can be deduced, is true, then the casual inferences which Hume rejects are valid, not indeed as giving certainty, but as giving a sufficient probability for practical purposes.
If this principle is not true, every attempt to arrive at general scientific laws from particular observations is fallacious, and Hume's skepticism is inescapable for an empiricist. The principle itself cannot, of course, without circularity, be inferred from observed uniformities, since it is required to justify any such inference. It must, therefore, be, or be deduced from, an independent principle not based on experience.
To this extent, Hume has proved that pure empiricism is not a sufficient basis for science. But if this one principle is admitted, everything else can proceed in accordance with the theory that all our knowledge is based on experience. It must be granted that this is a serious departure from pure empiricism, and that those who are not empiricists may ask why, if one departure is allowed, others are forbidden. These, however, are not questions directly raised by Hume's arguments.
What these arguments prove—and I do not think the proof can be controverted—is that induction is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either from experience or from other logical principles, and that without this principle, science is impossible. In a paper, Gilbert Harman explained that enumerative induction is not an autonomous phenomenon, but is simply a disguised consequence of Inference to the Best Explanation IBE. Thinkers as far back as Sextus Empiricus have criticised inductive reasoning.
Although the use of inductive reasoning demonstrates considerable success, the justification for its application has been questionable. Recognizing this, Hume highlighted the fact that our mind often draws conclusions from relatively limited experiences that appear correct but which are actually far from certain. In deduction, the truth value of the conclusion is based on the truth of the premise.
In induction, however, the dependence of the conclusion on the premise is always uncertain. For example, let us assume that all ravens are black. The fact that there are numerous black ravens supports the assumption. Our assumption, however, becomes invalid once it is discovered that there are white ravens. Therefore, the general rule "all ravens are black" is not the kind of statement that can ever be certain. Hume further argued that it is impossible to justify inductive reasoning: this is because it cannot be justified deductively, so our only option is to justify it inductively.
Since this argument is circular, with the help of Hume's fork he concluded that our use of induction is unjustifiable. Hume nevertheless stated that even if induction were proved unreliable, we would still have to rely on it. So instead of a position of severe skepticism , Hume advocated a practical skepticism based on common sense , where the inevitability of induction is accepted.
In , Karl Popper wrote, "Induction, i. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure. More recently, inductive inference has been shown to be capable of arriving at certainty, but only in rare instances, as in programs of machine learning in artificial intelligence AI. Even so, inductive reasoning is overwhelmingly absent from science.
Inductive reasoning is also known as hypothesis construction because any conclusions made are based on current knowledge and predictions. Examples of these biases include the availability heuristic , confirmation bias , and the predictable-world bias. The availability heuristic causes the reasoner to depend primarily upon information that is readily available to him or her. People have a tendency to rely on information that is easily accessible in the world around them. For example, in surveys, when people are asked to estimate the percentage of people who died from various causes, most respondents choose the causes that have been most prevalent in the media such as terrorism, murders, and airplane accidents, rather than causes such as disease and traffic accidents, which have been technically "less accessible" to the individual since they are not emphasized as heavily in the world around them.
The confirmation bias is based on the natural tendency to confirm rather than to deny a current hypothesis. Research has demonstrated that people are inclined to seek solutions to problems that are more consistent with known hypotheses rather than attempt to refute those hypotheses. Often, in experiments, subjects will ask questions that seek answers that fit established hypotheses, thus confirming these hypotheses.
For example, if it is hypothesized that Sally is a sociable individual, subjects will naturally seek to confirm the premise by asking questions that would produce answers confirming that Sally is, in fact, a sociable individual. The predictable-world bias revolves around the inclination to perceive order where it has not been proved to exist, either at all or at a particular level of abstraction. Gambling, for example, is one of the most popular examples of predictable-world bias.
Gamblers often begin to think that they see simple and obvious patterns in the outcomes and therefore believe that they are able to predict outcomes based upon what they have witnessed. In reality, however, the outcomes of these games are difficult to predict and highly complex in nature. In general, people tend to seek some type of simplistic order to explain or justify their beliefs and experiences, and it is often difficult for them to realise that their perceptions of order may be entirely different from the truth.
The following are types of inductive argument. Notice that while similar, each has a different form. A generalization more accurately, an inductive generalization proceeds from a premise about a sample to a conclusion about the population. There are 20 balls—either black or white—in an urn. To estimate their respective numbers, you draw a sample of four balls and find that three are black and one is white. A good inductive generalization would be that there are 15 black and five white balls in the urn. How much the premises support the conclusion depends upon a the number in the sample group, b the number in the population, and c the degree to which the sample represents the population which may be achieved by taking a random sample.
The hasty generalization and the biased sample are generalization fallacies. This is a Statistical  , aka Sample Projection. It is readily quantifiable. Compare the preceding argument with the following. This is inductive generalization. This inference is less reliable than the statistical generalization, first, because the sample events are non-random, and secondly because it is not reducible to mathematical expression. Statistically speaking, there is simply no way to know, measure and calculate as to the circumstances affecting performance that will obtain in the future.
On a philosophical level, the argument relies on the presupposition that the operation of future events will mirror the past.
In other words, it takes for granted a uniformity of nature, an unproven principle that cannot be derived from the empirical data itself. Arguments that tacitly presuppose this uniformity are sometimes called Humean after the philosopher who was first to subject them to philosophical scrutiny. This is a statistical syllogism. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, reproduced, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed without permission.
Use of this site constitutes acceptance of our terms and conditions of fair use. The argumentative essay is a genre of writing that requires the student to investigate a topic; collect, generate, and evaluate evidence; and establish a position on the topic in a concise manner. Please note : Some confusion may occur between the argumentative essay and the expository essay. These two genres are similar, but the argumentative essay differs from the expository essay in the amount of pre-writing invention and research involved. The argumentative essay is commonly assigned as a capstone or final project in first year writing or advanced composition courses and involves lengthy, detailed research.
Expository essays involve less research and are shorter in length. Argumentative essay assignments generally call for extensive research of literature or previously published material. Argumentative assignments may also require empirical research where the student collects data through interviews, surveys, observations, or experiments. Regardless of the amount or type of research involved, argumentative essays must establish a clear thesis and follow sound reasoning. In the first paragraph of an argument essay, students should set the context by reviewing the topic in a general way.
Next the author should explain why the topic is important exigence or why readers should care about the issue. Lastly, students should present the thesis statement. It is essential that this thesis statement be appropriately narrowed to follow the guidelines set forth in the assignment.
If the student does not master this portion of the essay, it will be quite difficult to compose an effective or persuasive essay.